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LAW REVIEWS "AS USUAL"?
A War Program
WALTER B. KENNEDYt
T[ODAY, America is contesting to the death a political and legal
philosophy which is alien to American traditions. Crushing idealism
and exalting opportunism, smothering the rights of the individual and
substituting the rule of might for the rule of law-this is the world crisis
which confronts our citizenry as they go forth to defend our institutions.
In this global war, which threatens Western civilization, what is the task
of the law reviews of America? Certain it is that the somewhat hackneyed,
albeit useful, phrase "as usual" is out for the duration-in government,
in business, in industry and in the life of the individual.
But what about Law Reviews "as usual"? Does it suffice in these trying
times to scan the pages of law reports for pivotal cases, border-line con-
troversies and pretty problems arising out of wartime conditions? Should
we be content to probe the current output of the courts and come forth in
Jack-Horner fashion with a few jural plums on the doctrine of impossi-
bility of performance in time of war, the definition of frozen funds or the
subtleties of sugar rationing? Certain it is that these bread and butter
problems deserve, and will receive, adequate treatment in the pages of
our law journals. But this admittedly important coverage of current
problems should not be the sole function of American law reviews in time
of war. When Christian-Judaic civilization is tottering' and the Four
Freedoms are temporarily immersed in a welter of ruthless slaughter and
complete submersion of the inalienable rights of man, the calm and prosaic
discussion of governmental decrees, contractual problems, or statutory
interpretations, however necessary, does not constitute the single objective
of legal periodicals dedicated to the constructive criticism and improve-
ment of law in general.
The weekly periodical, America, framed the issue in the following
words:
"The reign of law is the great question, and it is challenged now as never before
in all recorded time. The Totalitarians in an overwhelming onslaught of death-
t Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
1. Gannon, What Are We Really Fighting? (1942) 11 FoRDHAm L. Rlv. 249; LEHm&w,
THE INFLUENCE OF JUDGE CARDozo ON T=E Co 01oN LAW (1942) (First Annual Benjamin
N. Cardozo Lecture, delivered October 28, 1941, before the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York); Mackay, Needed: Great Faith to Match Great Faith, N. Y. Times
Magazine, Sept. 20, 1942, p. 3, 31.
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dealing armament have proclaimed a new right: the right of force, of arbitrary
wilful force, the right of the strong to subjugate the rest of men. With defiance
they reject the idea of a Divine source and sanction for law." 2
This is the time for frank and fearless analysis of self and society, of
governments and legal institutions. To the men of the law a particular
and weighty task is imperatively tendered:' it is in order for law review
editors and lawyers, for jurists and law students, to reflect upon the
course of law in the past, to assay its status in the present and to forecast
the future of law in the new world to come. It is not an overstatement
to assert, in the words of America, that the reign of law "is challenged
now as never before in all recorded time."
Surely one objective of law periodicals should be to review once more
the origin and source of all law-and of American law in particular-and
to ask whether we have, consciously or unconsciously, departed from the
juristic faith of the founders of our country, whether we are faced with
a breakdown or collapse of the ancient doctrines and classical concepts
of law. If there is visible any appreciable departure from the settled
principles of our formative era, it behooves us to reflect upon the merits.
or demerits of the old order and to compare them with the juristic sub-
stitutes which have gradually infiltrated into the legal order of America
in more recent years.
Law in Early America
It is appropriate and timely, when our thoughts go back to Lexington
and Valley Forge as symbols of the sterling courage of our forebears, to
reflect upon their elemental beliefs and ideologies in the domain of law.
If we seek today to emulate their valor and to match their sacrifices in
defense of our rights and liberties, it may be well to reconsider what those
liberties and rights were conceived to be, from whence they came, their
origin and their content.
2. The Vocation of Law (1942) 47 AmERicA 714. (Italics inserted.)
3. "Are lawyers non-essential?" is the question asked by the American Bar Association
Journal and the editor replies:
"Undisturbed by all unfounded aspersions, the lawyer can be relied upon to do all within
his powers of body and mind, to hasten the advent of Victory, and when force and arbitrary
power have been defeated and when laws are to be devised and interpreted and administered
for reconstructing a world based again on liberty and justice, the lawyers of this and every
other land will play their distinguished and useful part." (1942) 28 A. B. A. J. 827.
Herein and elsewhere, we find proof in word and deed that the Bench and Bar of America
are giving tangible proof that the generalization, Silent leges inter arma is not to be dis-
torted into a maxim which connotes the complete submersion of law in wartime. See
Llewellyn, The Crafts of Law Re-valued (1942) 28 A. B. A. J. 801.
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What were they fighting for? What are we fighting to preserve? Long
since forgotten is the demonstrable fact that American law was founded
upon the belief in Divine Law. It is. well to recall that our political and
legal institutions, in the minds of our founders, traced back to God. An
immortal sentence of the Declaration of Independence deserves to be
lifted once more out of our copybooks: "We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable rights. . . ." These words were not the
rhetorical effusions of early jurisprudential stylists. They meant just what
they said: that the individual is endowed with certain natural and
unalienable rights which belong to him because of his origin, nature and
ultimate end. Then follows in the Declaration of Independence a clear
statement of the part government plays in the protection of these natural
rights: "That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among
men." Governments exist then, not to create, but to secure these unalien-
able rights given to men by the Creator.
It should be carefully noted that the quoted passages from the Declara-
tion of Independence were not isolated pronouncements of the origin of
government or of the rights of man. These formal statements find abun-
dant support in colonial and post-colonial records. The full sweep of
historical research reinforces the facial expression of the Declaration of
Independence in its recognition of Divine authority and power as the true
Fountainhead of law. Colonial documents4 and political pamphlets5 of
4. See the Mayflower Compact (1620); The Fundamental Orders of Connecticut (1639);
the Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence (1779): Collected in 43 HARvARD CLASSICS
(1910).
A Resolution, adopted by the House of Representatives of Massachusetts on October 29,
1765, reiterated the current belief in the doctrine of natural rights in the following words:
"Resolved, That the inhabitants of this Province are unalienably entitled to those essential
rights in common with all men: and that no law of society can, consistent with the law of
God and nature, divest them of those rights." Reprinted in WRIGHT, Am.RICAN INTER-
PRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW (1931) 72.
For a complete documentation of the many instances wherein the colonists expressed their
reliance upon Divine law and the doctrine of inalienable rights, see RYAN AND MILLAR, THE
STATE AND THE CHURCH (1922) passim; WRIGHT, AwmRICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL
LAW (1931) ch. 1-4; HAINES, THE REvIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930) ch. 3-4. In a
recent volume, Professor Wright states that the colonists "placed sole reliance upon the
'Laws of Nature and of Nature's God.'" WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIoNAL LAW (1942) 11. See, Mackay, supra note 1 at 31: "Apart from faith in God,
American history has no meaning. In this faith our institutions were created, our laws
enacted and our liberties secured"; Gannon and Lehman, supra note 1; infra note 27.
5. Winthrop, Deputy Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, traced the
power of government to God in the following words: "Arbitrary Government is where a
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these times give clear and repeated expression to the same theories of
government: That the state exists for the individual, not the individual
for the state; and that the citizen derives his basic rights not from the
state but from the Creator. Our modern scholars, however critical they
may be of the validity or permanency of the doctrines of natural law
and natural rights, freely accept the historical accuracy of the conclusion
that such concepts of law were widely held at the very beginning of our
national existence.'
Suffice it to say that the foregoing fragments of legal and extra-legal
lore sum up to a pioneer philosophy of law in America which recognizes
the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man, which conceives of
government as an agency established to insure the protection of God-given
rights. A simple formula, but one which, sad to recall, has long since been
abandoned in the world about, and in our own fair land as well.
Law in Our Time
For a generation and Itore, the fashion has been to divorce all eternal
and natural law from positive law.7 More legalistically stated, any
attempted joinder of God and law has been followed by a dogmatic decree
of annulment pronounced by our learned philosophers and law men who
people have men set over them, without their choice or allowance; who have power to
govern them, and judge their causes without a rule.
"God only hath this prerogative; whose sovereignty is absolute, and whose will is a
perfect rule, and reason itself; so as forman to usurp such authority, is tyranny, and
impiety." WINTHROP, ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT DESCRIBED (1644), reprinted in 43 HARVARD
CLAssics (1910) 90. See Guthrie, American Philosophical Past and Present, P.AsEs or
AmERIcAN CULTURE (1942) 37-50; Parsons, Philosophical Factors in the Integration of
American Culture, id. at 15-24.
The importance of religion and morality in the structure of government was emphasized
by President Washington in his Farewell Address: "Of all the dispositions and habits, which
lead to political prosperity, Religion, and Morality are indispensable supports. . . . Observe
good faith and justice towards all Nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with all.-Religion
and Morality enjoin this conduct; and can it be, that good policy does not equally enjoin
it?-It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, at no distant period, a great nation, to
give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a People always guided by an
exalted justice and benevolence." Washington, Farewell Address (1796), reprinted in (1910)
43 HARVARD CLASsIcs 250, 260, 261. (Italics inserted.)
6. HLuxNs, supra note 4; WRIGHT, supra note 4; Corwin, The Higher Law Background
of American Constitutional Law (1928-1929) 42 HARv. L. REV. 149, 365.
7. HOLMES, Natural Law, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1921) 310; POUND, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE PmosoPnv or LAW (1922) 97-99; FRoxnt, The Religious Interpretation (1930)
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, ch. XVIII; cf. Kennedy, Pragmatism As a Philosophy of Law
(1925) 9 MARQUETTE L. REV. 63.
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proclaim that any reference to God in the fabrication or evaluation of
law is null and void ab initio.
Beginning at least with the advent of pragmatic jurisprudence with its
super-standards of clashing claims and wants, rather than of rights and
duties, with its down-to-earth test of "results and consequences" and its
ouster of the inalienable rights of man, followed by legal realism with its
rejection-in whole' or in part-of the belief in "a government of laws"
and the substitution of "a government of men", the blackout of a "higher
law" inevitably followed. All mention of God in relation to legal problems
was taboo. If proof is needed, one may read again the recent works and
writings of American jurisprudential scholars and legal philosophers.
The deepest reflections and "credos" of our most distinguished jurists
reveal all too clearly that they hold, seemingly without the formality oi
necessity of positive proof, the postulate that there is no place, proximate
or remote, for God in the law.'
Whenever they deem it necessary to refer back to the era when the
simple men of former times placed reliance upon Divine guidance in the
legal order, they dismiss it as a curious revival of Aristotelean or Platonic
mythology, indorsed and developed by the Christian philosophers of the
Middle Ages-an outmoded mysticism which flamed forth momentarily
in the writings of the forefathers in the early years of the American
State,'" but was gradually shadowed and long since blanketed by the
glorious discovery that man was potent enough to shape his own destiny,
that Science is King and that its Kingdom embraces the making and
evaluating of all laws. In fine, our legal philosophers contend that man
is capable of guiding his own course through life without any norms or
standards derived from the Divine order, without any durable principles
to weigh or estimate the quality of the output by legislature or courts.
But what is the nature of man in the new legal order? Surely this
imperious individual ought to be able to frame a mechanistic Utopia, now
8. BINGHAM, Co-author, MY PHImosoPHY OF LAW (1941) 16: "Let us banish from our
professional tenets the absurd dogma 'a government of laws and not of men'. It has a
meaning, concealed rather than expressed, and a use in practical politics, but there is no
place for it in legal science." RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYERS! (1939) passin. Cf.
FRANcK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS (1942) ch. 1.
9. MY PmIOsoPHY oF LAW (1941). In this volume fifteen leading legal scholars set
forth their "credos" of law without any affirmative approval of eternal or natural law.
10. For proof of the close relation between medieval philosophy and the democratic
theory of government, see Ryx ANi1 MIILLAR, supra note 4, passim. Holdsworth pays a
warm tribute to the contribution of medieval thinkers in furthering the doctrine of the
supremacy of right, legal' and moral, in both public and private law. HoLDSwoRTH, 2
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1927) 132-133.
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that he alone is empowered to control his universe, divorced from'the
sterile dogma of a God-head. But man, who emerges from the test tubes
and retorts of juristic laboratories, is indeed a queer creature: His reason
has been dissected and found wanting, his free will frozen into muscular
behavior, his legal and judicial actions determined in goodly degree not
by reason, impartial judgment or justice, but by hunches, environment,
prejudice and even gastronomical disturbances.1 This is the mighty
man who is assigned to the task of planning a New World in the Law.
Not able to determine or to govern his own individual actions, he is invited
to determine and to govern the Scientific Olympus blue-printed by legal
realists.
One last step remains to be noted in the descent of traditional' law, a
step inevitable and logical, but a step which shocked even the pioneers
of pragmatic reform when it was first taken by the outriders of surrealism.
If positive law, fabricated entirely by man, is in fact a mixture of mere
claims and wants, power and force, if man himself is a chemical con-
glomeration of muscular motivations and environmental impulses-a
"'cosmic ganglion," in the words of the great Holmes-why perpetuate
the legal fiction we call positive, human law? Why not frankly admit that
the entire structure of man-made law rests upon empty concepts and
meaningless rules of no value or reality?
The questions are not rhetorical; they have been answered. "I used to
say," says America's leading realist, ". . . that truth.is the majority vote
of that nation that can lick all others."' 2 Hence might, not right, deter-
mines "truth". "Every tribe needs its totem and its fetish and the Con-
stitution is ours." 3 So states Max Lerner, and Thurman Arnold adds:
"The language of the Constitution is immaterial since it represents current
myths and folklore rather than rules." 4 Thus our organic law is reduced
to the proportions of a modernized totem pole upon which to hang current
myths anent a "higher law". It remained for neo-realists to take the last
step. They boldly contend that Law, all Law, should be completely
abandoned. 5 Representing the advance guard of the critics of traditional
11. Kennedy, Psychologism in the Law (1940) 29 GEO. L. J. 139.
12. HoLMEs, Natural Law, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1921) 310. See Ford, The Funda-
inentals of Holmes' Juristic Philosophy (1942) 11 FoRDHAM L. REV. 255.
13. Lerner, Constitution and Court As Symbols (1937) 46 YALE L. 3. 1290, 1294.
14. ARNOLD, THE FOLrCLORE OP CAPITALISM (1937) 29.
15. RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYERS! (1939). The extent of Professor Rodell's dis-
missal of the Law is clearly expressed in the following passage: "What is ever to be done
about the fact that our business, our government, even our private lives, are supervised
and run according to a scheme of contradictory and nonsensical principles built of inherently
1943]
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law, paying warm tribute to their pragmatic and realist mentors, they
cynically reject the very law which man himself proudly *proclaims that
he alone has made.
Thus the cycle of God-less law comes to an end. First, no eternal law,
then no natural law, next no constitutional law-and now no positive law,
no law at all! Here in brief is the time table of modern jurisprudence
with its central motif of Law without God.'
The span of years from Holmes, the father of American legal realism,
to the advocates of "no-law", embraces but a single generation. Within
that brief span, American jurisprudence has nose-dived through the
successive stages of optimistic pragmatism, temperate skepticism, helpless
cynicism to utter despair of rule by law.
This is the jurisprudential chaos which faces us as we enter a World
War dedicated to the retention or recapture of the Four Freedoms and
the implementation of the Atlantic Charter.
One fact is patent: America today rejects the philosophy of force, the
"law" of dictators founded upon racial supremacy or imperial dynasty,
the submersion of the individuality of man in the might of the Totalitarian
State. Here, in all its practical and naked workings is visible the God-less
State, the death of the rights of man. Witness the full sweep of their
political pragmatism: "Results and consequences" determine the truth
and validity of human action; the "good" act is one which works! Tested
meaningless abstractions? What is to be done about the fact that we are all slaves to the
hocus-pocus of The Law-and to those who practice the hocus-pocus, the lawyers?
"There is only one answer. The answer is to get rid of all lawyers and throw The Law
with a capital L out of the system of laws. It is to do away entirely with both the magicians
and their magic and run our civilization according to practical and comprehensible rules,
dedicated to non-legal justice, to common-or-garden fairness that the ordinary man can
understand, in the regulation of human affairs." (p. 249). See also McDougal, Fuller v.
The American Legal Realists: An Intervention (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 827. For a current esti-
mate of the effects of realist nihilism, see Ayres, Book Review (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 881.
1Sa. While it is not within the province of this paper to examine the matter fully, it is
submitted that there is a striking parallel between the degrees of various realists' rejection of
traditional law andI the degrees of such realists' opposition to any concept of a higher law.
One can generally grade the extent of a realist's antagonism to Anglo-American legal tradi-
tions by noting the extent of his expressed antagonism to eternal or natural law, and to
moral or ethical values. The more pronounced his cynicism or skepticism of durable legal
rules and principles, the more sweeping and pessimistic will be his appraisal of a priori
concepts, norms and standards derived from eternal or natural law; or reached by man's
reason.
The scholastic position that there is a marked relationship between "law-less" law and
"God-less law" deserves more attention than it has.received from non-scholastic anti-realists.
The writer has developed this thesis briefly and inadequately in My Pm=osopn-r oF LAw
(1941) 145.
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thus, who can deny that totalitarian blitzkrieg, weighed in the scales of
drab materialism or scientism, has established itself and is "good" for
the present at least. Is it necessary to add that America rejects the
Golden Rule of the Axis powers, that successful slaughter spells "truth"?
Rebirth of Idealism
Out of the ruins of World War II, out of the what's-the-use cynicism
of recent years in philosophical and jurisprudential circles, there is emerg-
ing a sudden realization that our future course calls for a reconsideration
of fundamental values, a revaluation of our patterns of living, a reassess-
ment of our legal relations. Sensate culture, as Sorokin tells us,16 is
exhausted; modern irrationalism has filed a petition in bankruptcy;
pragmatism has betrayed us and has been indicted; realism is not real
enough to hold back the inherent nature and yearnings of man.
A pronounced return to spiritual values in the political and legal orders
is evidenced in current literature. Russell W. Davenport in an article
appearing in Fortune magazine argues for a return to the discarded spir-
itual values-a recognition "of an ultimate relationship between the
human and the divine"." John Alexander Mackay, President of Prince-
ton Theological Seminary, says: "To reinterpret the motto on the copper
penny is our contemporary task. Dare we repeat seriously the words
'In God We Trust'?"" Professor Hocking holds no -brief for medieval-
ism, but he asserts that Man in his obsession with science has forgotten
his soul, has forgotten God.'" Dean Pound no longer emphasizes the
weighing of claims and wants as the end of law. Submerged is his prag-
matic test of the 20's. He now says: "gut some part of the path of the
juristic thought of tomorrow is already apparent. It seems to be toward
an ideal of cooperation rather than one of *competitive self-assertion."2 °
The stated objective of the brotherhood of man takes priority over his
old formula that man seeks to acquire the world and that the main func-
tion of law is to soften the clashes which are present in such endeavor.
He also pleads for a reconsideration of the elements that make up the
man of principle. "Claims and wants" are quite docile today in compe-
tition with the inherent "rights and duties" of mankind. Jerome Frank
contends that good government calls for "decent, honest, God-fearing
16. SOROKIN, MAN AND SOCIETY IN CA AMITY (1942).
17. Davenport, This Would Be Victory (1941) 24 FORTUNE 45.
.18. Mackay, supra note 1.
19. Hoc=nG, WiAT MAN CAN MAxE OF MAN (1942).
20. POUND, SOcIA CONTROL TmOUGH LAW (1942) 126-127. (Italics inserted.)
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men".2 ' Llewellyn writes on the Good, the True and the Beautiful in
the Law.2 -
These are typical indications which permit us to take heart and affirm
that juristic idealism is on the upswing. From variant sources, including
scholars who formerly stressed the pragmatic or realistic viewpoints of
the law, come recognitions that the concept of law calls for something
more than a bundle of claims and wants, hunches and stimuli, behavior
patterns and totem poles.
Natural law is also returning in jurisprudential discussion and is
awarded a place long since denied in the halls of modern jurisprudence. 3
Why not? Surely a concept which dates back to the Greek and Roman
eras, formed the core of philosophia perennis in the Middle Ages, was
dominant in the days of our forefathers, 24 has an unbroken reign and
inherent worth which enables it to survive the criticism of modern juris-
prudes or the death sentence pronounced by a distinguished jurist.25
To return to our initial question: Law Reviews "as usual"? We submit
that the answer is "No". These are not normal times. "The reign of law
.. . is challenged now as never before in all recorded time. ' 6 Let us
then, with due recognition of our responsibility to review current devel-
opments of municipal law, accept the ruthless challenge to the reign of
law. Let us do our part in preserving the heritage of law in America-
and aiding in its preservation throughout the world. This battle for law
must be won not alone on the far-flung battle fields, but on the home
front as well.
"Statesman, prelate and judge, Protestant, Catholic and Jew are united.
in the conviction that the inalienable rights of the individual, formulated
21. FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS (1942) *13.
22. Llewellyn, On The Good, The True, The Beautiful, In The Law (1942) 9 U. or Cui.
L. REV. 224. The idealist may also applaud Professor Llewellyn's reminder that "technique
without ideals is a menace", and his further observation that of late lawyers have lost the
broad vision of right and justice of the early Bench and Bar in the narrow pursuit of the
interests of a particular client or class. Llewellyn, The Crafts of Law Re-valued (1942)
28 A. B. A. J. 801, 803; Frank, J., dis. op. in U. S. v. St. Pierre, decided Dec. 15, 1942, ad.
op., pp. 363-364, - F. (2d) - (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
23. Pound, The Revival of Natural Law (1942) 17 NOTRE DAmE LAwYER 287. Fuller,
Reason and Fiat in Case Law (Second Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, delivered
October 27, 1942 at the Association of the Bar, New York, reprinted in N. Y. L. J. October
28, 29, 30, 1942.)
24. Supra, notes 1-7.
25. Holmes, op. cit. supra, note 7.
26. Supra, note 2.
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and assured by our law, rest upon a foundation eternal and immutable
because it is divine. There lies America's unity."2 7
NOTE
Since the above article was written, Pope Pius X1I's Christmas Message
has been broadcasted to the world. Herein the Holy Pontiff develops
inter alia the juridical order of society and urges the rebirth of funda-
mental principles of Jaw. The importance of Pope Pius XII's address and
its obvious relationship to the above article are evident. Pertinent parts
of the official translation are appended:
"The origin and the primary scope of social life is the conservation,
development and perfection of the human person, helping him to realize
accurately the demand and values of religion and culture set by the
Creator to every man and to all mankind, both in the whole and in its
natural ramifications .... "
"From the juridic order as willed by God, flows man's inalienable right
to juridical security, and by this very fact to a definite sphere of rights
immune from all arbitrary attack .... ,28
"The juridical order has ... the high and difficult scope of insuring
harmonious relations both between individuals and between societies, and
within these. This scope will be reached if legislators will abstain from
following those perilous theories and practices, so harmful to communities
and to their spirit of union, which derive their origin and promulgation
from false postulates.
Among such postulates we must count the juridical positivism which
attributes a deceptive majesty to the setting up of purely humani laws, and
which leaves the way open for a fateful divorce of law from morality.9
There is, besides, the conception which claims for particular nations,
or races, or classes the juridical instinct as the final imperative and the
norm 'from which there is no appeal. Finally, there are those various
theories which, differing among themselves, and deriving from opposite
ideologies, agree in considering the State or a group which represents it,
as an absolute and supreme entity, exempt from control and from criticism
even when its theoretical and practical postulates result in and offend by
27. LEHaAN, THE INFLuENCE OF JUDGE CARDOZO ON THE ComoN LAW, (1942) 33 (First
Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, delivered October 28, 1941, before the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York).
28. Italics inserted. The striking similarity of Pope Pius XlI's definition of the juridic
order and the classic statements of our forefathers is worth noting. See supra, pp. 51-53.
29. See supra, pp. 53-56.
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their open denial of essential tenets of the human and Christian con-
science.
Any one who considers with an open and penetrating mind the vital
connection between social order and a genuine juridical order will realize
at once the urgent need of a return to a conception of law which is spir-
itual and ethical, serious and profound, vivified by the warmth of true
humanity and illumined by the splendor of the Christian faith which bids
us seek in the juridical order an outward refraction of the social order
willed by God, a luminous product of the spirit of man which is in turn
the image of the spirit of God. .. "
"The relations of man to man, of the individual to society, to authority,
to civil duties, the relations of society and, of authority to the individual
should be placed on a firm juridic footing and be guarded, when the need
arises, by the authority of the courts. This supposes:
Firstly: A tribunal and a judge who take their directions from a clearly
formulated and defined right;
Secondly: Clear juridical norms which may not be overturned by un-
warranted appeals to a supposed popular sentiment or by merely utili-
tarian considerations; and
Thirdly: The recognition of the principle that even the State and the
functionaries and organizations dependent on it are obliged to repair and
to withdraw measures which are harmful to the liberty, property, honor,
progress or health of the individuals. .. "
"What is this world war, with all its attendant circumstances, whether
they be remote or proximate causes, its progress and material, legal and
moral effects-what is it but the crumbling process, not expected, perhaps,
by the thoughtless, but seen and deprecated by those whose gaze pene-
trated into the realities of a social order which, behind a deceptive exterior
or the mask of conventional shibboleths, hid its mortal weakness and its
unbridled lust for gain and power?3o
That which in peacetime lay coiled up, broke loose at the outbreak of
war in a sad succession of acts at variance with the human and Christian
sense.
International agreements to make war less inhuman by confining it to
the combatants, to regulate the procedure of occupation and the imprison-
ment of the conquered, remained in various places a dead letter; and who
can see the end of this progressive demoralization of the people; who can
wish to watch impotently this disastrous progress?
Should they not rather, over the ruins of a social order which has given
30. See supra, pp. 56-57.
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such tragic proof of its ineptitude as a factor for the good of the people,
gather together the hearts of all those who are magnanimous and upright
in the solemn vow not to rest until in all peoples and all nations of the
earth a vast legion shall be formed of those handfuls of men who, bent
on bringing back society to its center of gravity, which is the law of God,
aspire to the service of the human person and of his common life ennobled
in God? ..."
31. See supra, pp. 57-59.
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